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T1.0 INTRODUCTION
i.I Type of Experiment
I.I.i Purpose and Accomplishments
The irradiation tests for the NENVA program will
involve the use of the horizontal through tube (HT-I) at
Plum Brook. To simulate the _RVA environment, facilities
will be required to permit testing of irradiated test
samples at cryogenic temperatures. This will be accomplished
by placing test samples in an enclosed capsule and inserting
this capsule into the horizontal through tube. Remotely
operated handling devices will be installed in the quadrant "C"
portion of the reactor. The capsule will be maintained ;:t
the desired temperature by means of a cryogenic loop.
f
1.1.2 Location
The experiments are to be conducted at'_ne- _aoa __um
Brook Reactor Facility, Sandusky, Ohio. The HT-1 test hole
located in quadrant "C" will be used for the experiment.
1.1.3 Element Cooling
The test element will be cooled by the circulation of
gaseous helium at the desired mass flow rate in a closed loop.
1.2 Experiment Objectives
The objective of the test is to study the performance and
behavior o:_ materials and components at gas flow, heat flux, neutron
flux and temperature conditions of the NERVA program applicat.ion. The
loop will be designed to suppl_ helium to the test sample in the
capsule at a temperature of 50 R. This gas will be capable of absorbing
heat within the capsule at a rate of 20 _ at the _O_R temperature.
1.3 .Test Sample !
Test samples to be subjected to irradiation will consist of the
items listed in Table I. Environmental conditions for tho tests
include cryogenic temperatures from 380R to ambient and _tegrat_
thermal and f=st neutron fluxes up to i.i x lO_nvt a_ 5._ x lO_7.!_t, %_
- respectively. An integrated gamma dose up to 5 x lO±UR (&._ x i0A_ !
ergs gm _ (C)) will be experienced in some tests with up to 50 hours of :
i,
i
- ............. _, ,......
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Irradiationtime required, It shohld be noted that th ^
tests listed include only those at low temperalures,
.Fueled'_°s_ple_and higher temperature range tests will
require"different capsule designs.
i.A Lo__qp._F_lgw.p.iaKr_:
System piping and ccmponenbs for the cryogenic loop _
are shown in Figure 2. It should be noted that the specific
temperatures, pressures and flow rates shown on the schematic
represent approximate conditions expected under normal
condztlon_ It is conceivable that samples producing less
•han 20 KW could be tested at lower tmmperatures than 50°R.
i,5 Utility Requirements
The utility °requirementsfor the t _sting program are
listed in Tables II and !II.
1.6 Capsule Handlin_ and Checkout_Procedure
After a test sample has been in'tailed in the capsule I
and the assembly is complete, __._,_" :" " _,.o_ . .:._owlngprocedure will
apply:
a) Make continuity _ests _f all capsule ins__-umentation
and power lee_dsfrom the experiment con_z_olroom patch
panel to in_hre good connections and pro_ orientation
of Sensing devices. _
b) Pressurize t ,__apsule pressure envelope=_::n helium by
cracking open the capsule helium supply _ _ationvalve
on the helium recirculating system._ W_ .;:,ecapsule
reaches normal operating pressure, clc:_< :_e helium supply
valve; and moni'corthe local pressltrr,- .=_:_<_for pressure
d_op.
c) Start capsule vacuum pump, and co__e.n,_spulling vacuum
on the capsule vacuum Jacket. If _p,_ratingvacuum
pressure cannot be attained, a heli_m_to vacuum leak o
can be assumed; and the capeule end plug will have to be
removed for inspection. = -
d) Insertion console operator insures proper phone
com_u_cations with hot cave oper&tor. -
j_
2
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e} Hot cave o_erator closes quadrant wall tube
door, insures that the tube drain is shut an_
relieves pressu_-e from inflatable seal.
f) Re_se "in" position lock on quadrant wall
!nser+.ion bray by means of "lock release"
push_Ut,ton on vapor container control console.
_) Withdra_ capsule from quadrant wall tube by
means @f the quadrant w'_ll in_rtlon tray
"in-out" switch on vapor oontalner control
¢onsole o Ket cave operato? checks quadrax,t
wall tmbe 4_or for leaks.
h) When capsule reaches f_Ll "oa,h"position, close
quadrant _ tu_e" walve manually from 0 ft. _
level above quadraWto
i) Swing polar crane _ _L_ion, and secure pickup
device to the capsule -middl6 section".
J) Release quadrant wall insertion tray clamp from •
the capsule "middle secti6_", i_
k) Pick up capsule from quadrant wall insertior,
tray, and transfer it to the HT-I insertion tray.
1) When the capsule is in proper position on _.e HT-1
slide drive, secure its clamp to the capsule
"middle section" and remove the pickup device.
m) Complete capsule cooldown and final checkc. _.of
instrumentation, if
n) Vapor container control console operator insures _
proper communications with the experiment control i
room. _ i_
o) Insert the capsule into the HT-I inflatable seal
by means of the HT-I tray "in-out" awit_h on the i
vapor container control console until position ___
lock i engages. ;
p) Inflate the inflatabl._ seal t,_ insertion pawssure, i'_
...... L - ._ mm,jLU m mmmm_ mmNpm m m m_ m _ m- _ m
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q) O_ HT-I motor operated gate valve by means of
the "open" pushbutton on the vapor container
control _onsole.
r) _Pnen permission is received from the experiment
control rc_m to "insert capsule", release position
lock 1 by means of "lock release" pushbutton on
vapor container control console.
B) Insert the caVsnle to full "in" position by means
of t_e HT-1 tray "in-out" switch on the vapor
container control console, and insure that position
lock 2 is engaged.
t) b_Igagethe clamp on the H_-I and capsule flanges by
means nf the "engag@" _,-shbutton on the vapor con-
_aih_r control console.
u) Inflat_ t_e inflatable seal to operating pressure.
v) Notif_ _He experiment control room that the capsule
is f_ inserted and secured.
w) Shift "Sapsule withdrawal control" to the experiment
control room.
x) When sample irradiation is _mp]ete, insure proper
phone communications among all stations.
y) Shift "caps-_!_ withdrawal control" to the vapor
container control console.
z) Reduce inflatable seal pressure to withdrawal pressure.
aa) Disengage the clamp Lrom capsttle and HT-1 flanges
by mean_ of the "disengage" pushbutton on the vapor
container control console.
bb) Obtain permission from the e_eriment control room
to "withdraw capsule".
cc) Release position lock 2 by means of "lock release"
pushbutton on the vapor container control console.
, i
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dd) Withdraw capsule by means of the HT-I Cr,ay
"in-out" s_tch on the vapor container control
console.
ff) Relieve pressure from HT-I inflatable seal.
gg) Release position lock 1 by means of "lock
release" pushbutton on the vapor container
console.
hh) Withdraw eaps,_e to the full "out" position
by means of the H_-I tray "in-out" switch on
the vapor c_ita_r_r control console. Commence
d ca[_ule warmup from the experLment control
room with the cryogenic system.
ii) Swing polar crane into position, _d secure the
pickup device to the capsule "middle section,".
JJ) Release HT-I insertion tray clamp from the
capsule "middle section".
kk) Pick up the capsule from the HT-I tray, and
transfer it to the quadrant wall insertion tray.
Ii) When the capsule is in _roper position on the
quadrant wall tray, secure its dlive slide clamp
to the capsule "middle section" and remove the
pickup device.
ram) Secure proper comm_mication with the hot cave
operat or.
nn) Manually open the quadrant wall tube gage valve
from the 0 ft. level above the quadrant.
oo) Hot cave operator checks quadrant wall tube door
for legks.
pp) Insert the rear end of th_ capsule into the quadl.ant
wall tube to the full "in" position, and ins,_re that
the full "in" position lock is engaged. _
, j
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qq) Inflate the quadrant wall tube inflatable
seal.
rr) Vapor container console operator directs
hot cave operator to drain the quadrant wall
tube and observe whether the inflatable seal
is sealing properly.
ss) Direct hot cave operator to open the quadrant
wall tube door.
tt) _Pnen the capsule warmup is complete, manually
valve the cryogenic system to recirculabe
conditions; and isolate the capsule under
direction of the _xperiment control room.
uu) Bleed helium pressure from the capsule with
bleed valve in basement area.
w) Secure cqpsule vacuum pump and break vacuum.
The capsule is now ready for disassembly and
sample removal.
6
f
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2.0 DESCI_PTION OF _F_UIPMENT AND FACILITZES
To perform the tests in the hori_.ontal through tube, various modifica-
tions and additions to the existing facilities are required. These additions
and modificationJ are shown in Figure 1.
A capsule will house the test .samples. This inpile capsule
is a cylindrical aluminum tube having a varied diame%er. For
descriptive purposes, three sections of the capsule are considered.
The "front sectirn", which k_ll be inserted into the horizontal
through tube (HT-1) for irradiation, will be approximately 8 1/2" in
o,_tside diameter and 9' 8" in length. This section is connected by
means of a flange to a "middle section". The "middle section" will
be approximately ]l 1/2" in diameter and 3' in length. A "rear
section", which will be inserted into the quadrant wall through tube
for specimen removal, will be approximately 11 1/2" in diameter and
5m in length.
2.1.1 Front Section
The "front section" shown in Figtums _, _, and 6 will
house tho _.est samples. It will be a cy.li_drical shell with one .
end closed with a hemispherical head _Id the other end opened
to the "middle section". The "fronh section" eo.ntzdms a helium
supply pipe, helium return pipe e.nd _ample container. The outer
shell of the "front section" terminates at the start-of the
"middle section" by means of a flange. Helium piping will b-
installed concuntcically within the outer shell and will be • ?
convinuous Zo the "middle section". The helium supp_ pipe w_
be constructed in sections which can be discor_e_ed at various
points for removal to provide access to the test samples. In
effect, the helium inlet pipe may be cer_idered as a pull rod
for the sample container. The helium return line w_31 house
the specimen supply pi_ and w_.I]be sealed at the froi_ end
with a welded h_mispherical head so that a vaclvum c_-,be pulled
between it and the outer shell. Since a portic_l of the helium
piping in this section will be exposed to high g_m-_ heatL-_,
the piping _ll be designed for _ ____asconsistent with
pressure code requirements.
a) Materials
k
i) Drawn aluminum tube 6061-T6 will be used for
the outer shell and the mapply and return piping.
?
j T
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I) The _ar Bh¢_. of the "front section" will be
des_4 _i_h _c_sideration given to the 160 psia
primary oa_iant water in the through tube, the
forces du_ _o _apsule insertion, interior forces
resulting _m piping failure _nd normal handling
stre_ses_
2) The helium p_ing will be designed with consideration
given to forces due to specimen insertion, stresses
due to the extreme temperature gradients and the
]15 pain internal loop pressure.
3) All portions of the capsule directly affected by
press_Are are de_ed in accord,_nce with the ASME
Unfired Pressure V_ec_l Code, Section VIII.
2.1.2 Middle Section
This _cction (_hown in Figure 7) will consist of an
outer shell, helium inlet pipe connections, helium return pipe
com_ections, a helium supply pipe continuous from the "front
section" and a helium return pipe. Also, this section will
contain a penetration for the capsule and specimen instrumentation
lines. All instrumentation iii_esand piping will enter the
capsule at this "middle section". The variatio_ in d_ameter
between the "middle Section" and "front section" is accomplished
by means of a flange. There will also be a flange on the opposite
end of the "middle section" which separates the _d(_e and rear
sections.
a) Materials
Th_eouter shell, flanges, inner piping and all connectors
in the "middle section" will be constructed of A!SI ty-_
300 series stainless steel tubing.
b) Design
I) The outer shell will be designed with consideration
given to the forces resulting from the insertion
device and other handling stresses (see insertion
mechauisms discussion).
8
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m2) _¢,e £!ange _a?_rating the '!middle section" from the
"front section" will be designed to resist the primary
coolant water pressure, which _ill r=_s_It if the
inf!atab.!_ _ea! mechanism fails (_ee HT-I s_.almech_-_s_.:
discussion). The fB__ngc, w'nich sept-ares th_ ::mfLd:;ie
sectien" from Lhe "rear section'_ will be designed to
resist the quadrant water pressure occurr_kE at the
time of specimen removal (see quadr&nt wall through tube
seal mechanism discussion).
3) Inner piping of the _iddle sectioH' will be designed to
resist temperature gradient stress and cryogenic loop
pressures.
2.1.3 Rear Section
Th_ "rear section" will consist of an outer shell, inner
sample removal shell and a removable plug. The outer shell
will, in effect, be continuous from the "midd]e section" wlth
the "middle section" flange marking the transition. _"T,.s_mer
sample remova] shell will be installed concentrically within
the outer shell. Between the outer shell and the inner shell,
permanent _ring will be installed for capsule and sample
instrumentation. This wiring enters th_ capsule through the
"middle section" and continues to the back plate of the "rear
section". Electrical jumper coDnectors are installed on the
end plate. The end plug will be placed in the irmer shell and
will consist of shielding material (streaming barrier),
electrical leads and secondary helium seal. l%_isplug will
extend from the end of the "rear section" to the "middle section"
at the helium inlet line connection point. At this point, a
seal will prevent leakage of helium to the vacuum gap.
a) Materials
The outer shell, inner shell and end plug will be constructed
of AISI type 300 stainless steel.
b) Design
i) The outer shell will be designed to resist forces due
to Luse_ion _nd normal hand]_ing stresses.
k
2) The inner shell will be designed to resist forces =
resultant from specimen and end plug insertion.
9
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%_) Ti_ end plng will be designed to provide a barrier
for neutron, strea_ing and to resist internal pressure.
2.2 ca__2Dsul__e_ Insertion. Equipment
So that experiments can be inserted into horizontal t}_c"gh
tube HT-2 as well as HT-1, the insei%ion equipment for HT-2 will
be designed and installed with the equipment for HT-1. For capsule
insertion and removal, there will be three capsule insertion trays
used in conjunction with the existing PBRF vapor container overhead
polar crane, One tray will service HT-1, one HT-2 and a third the
quadrant wall 12-inch tube. These loading trays are illustrated in
Figure i.
The reactor thr.ou£h +_-,_,beinso_ion brays -_fl-Ibe
essentially identical except that the tray for HT-I will
acconu.Lodatemu 8 1/2" capsule while the tray for HT-2 will
accommodate an ll 1/2" capm_le. The major components will
be constructed of stairD.ess steel, Each unit will consist
of a drive slide rail supported by a framework of welded
pipe. Feet welded to the bottom of the framework will be
bolted to baseplates secured to the quadrant floor. The
drive slide rail will house the lower section of a drive
slide and guide it by means of machined ways. The end of
the rail will not be secured to the end of the through tube;
hence, the resultant forces of capsule insertion and
withdrawal will be transmitted to the quadrant floor. The
upper section of the drive slide will clamp onto the center
section of the capsule assembly and transmit the insertion
and withdrawal forces of the drive slide to the capsule.
The drive slide will be driven by a worm shaft running
through the drive slide and supported on the through tube
end of the loading tray by a bearing. The opposite end of
+he drive shaC_ will be driven by a constant speed AC electric
motor and reduction gear secured to the slide drive rail and
tray framework, fhe design speed of the drive assembly will
be consistent with requirements for safe capsule insertion and
withdrawal. Pro__,_ion is made for manual operation of the
d__ivemechanism for capsule withdrawal in tle event of power
failure to the drive mote:'.
Electrical interlocks operating in conjunction with
mechanical stops on the trays will prevent the capsule from
passir4 certain critical positions during insertion or withdrawal
until the interlocks are defeated and the stops released.
i0
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Torque switches will prevent overloading the electric
drive motor, damage to the capsule or through tube valve
or seal.
The quadrant wall tube insertion tray will be
constructed and will operate similarly to the through
tube insertion trays and wi.11 have the abLl£ty to handle
either a front or rear loading capsule "_.ithminor modJflca-
tion. It will be hinged at the quadrant wall tube so that
it can swing back against the outer quadrant wall during
reactor shutdown to allow space for PBRF fuel cart transit
in the quadrant. _e capsule will be lifted by means of
device which v_ll attach to the capsule "middle see%ion" '
and the overhead crane. The capsule will be transferred
from one tray to another in this mauler during operation
and provide for capsule handling during sysLen installation
and maintenance.
An aluminum console containing the insertion equipment
local controls and instrumentation will be located on the
northwest side of quadrant "C" on the 0 ft. level near the
o_erhvad crane controls. This console will be on wheels so
that it can be moved to the edge of quadrant "C" to afford
the operator a view of the underwater operations.
2.3 Ilot Cave
To remove the sample from the capsttle, a hot cave will be
required. The sample removal hot cave shown in Figure :?will be
located in area 17 outside and adjacent to the quadrant "C" wall.
It will be of a aemi-permanent type construction Which will consist
of a 1/2" thick welded u_eel enclosure with a roof which will mate
with the qua&r_It wall, area 17 floor, and area 17 outer wall. These
joints will be sealed to provide a gas tight enclosure around t_e
two 12" quadrant wall tubes. The entire unit will be secure_ _ the
walls to hold the cave in place against a small internal heliua
pressv_-e. The steel box will be surrounded with stackable 8" thick,
interlocked<, high density concrete blocks. Shielding will be designed
to maintain minimum personnel exI_sure never exceeding FBP,.Fmaximum
allowable levels. All hot cave penetr_.Lions except the two 12"
quadrant wall tubes will be welded to the steel enclosure to provide
support of penetrating equipment and insure gas tight Joints.
The cave will contain a permanent radiation mDnit.oring device k
with an indicator at the hot cave and an indicator and recorder in
the experiment control room. Radiation mDnitorlmg _ be mapple-
mented by portable equipment used during hot cave operation.
11
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The helium inerting systen_to avoid cc._tamination of the
cryoge..ic system,will consist of a tap off the cz3"ogenic system
supplying the hot cave via tubing and a pressure regulator. The
system includes a water filled manometer device which will provide
hot cave pressure indication as well as pressure relief capabilities.
A standard liquid zinc bromide window will be installed in
the front wall of the hot cave above the capsule centerline which
will provide personnel radiation protection and a suitable view of
the capsule rear end and remote handling equipment.
Remote handling tools will penetrate the hot cave wall t_ough
an indexing drtLmdevice which can be manipulated to bring the tool
to be used into position. The indexing drum will be located on the
capsule centerline below the window.
A drain and collection system wil3 route and contain quadrant
water drained from _he quadrant wall tube during capsule insertions
and any leakage of quadrant water into the hot cave through the seal.
- The container will have a level indicating device and will be
constructed so that it may be handled as contaminated waste should
conditions warrant.
A phone s3;tem will be installed near the hot cave so that
communications _y be maintained with the experiment control room
and the insertion control station d:aring hot cave operation.
2.A Horizontal ThrouKh Tube (HT-1)SealinE System
The quadrant "A" end of HT-1 will be sealed to prevent primary
coolant leakage into quadrant "A". The quadrant "C" end of EJ:-!
will contain a valve, an inflatable seal, a flange, a primary
coolant connecting line and wear strips.
2._.1 Gate Valve
A gate valve will be install_ on the through tube to
insure against primary coolant water flow from the through tube
to the quadrant. This valve will be re_uotely operated and will
be closed except during periods of capsule insertion and irradiation.
2.&.2 Inflatable Seal
On the quadrant "C" side of the gate valve, an inflatable
seal will be installed. To insert the capsule into the through
tube, the gate valve must be opened. To insure against primary
12
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coolant flow into the quadrant, the inflatab] _ seal will
be secured on the capsule before the valve is opened. When
the valve is open, the remotely operated inflatable seal
will be the primary seal between the through water and
quadrant "C" water.
r
2.4.3 Backup Seal
The backup seal _ll be a gasketed flanged Joint.
The through tube flange v_ll mate with the capsule flange
at the fully insetted position and will act as a backup for
the inflatable seal.
2.4.4 Coolant Water Connectin_ Line
A connecting line will be installed to provide adequate
cooling water for the capsule shell when the capsule is in
he through tube. Th:'B line will include remotely operated
_ valve_ which will control cooling water input into the tube
and insure against uncontrolled coolant discharge into the
quadrant. This line will provide coolant flow in the through
tube past the capsule from front to rear toward quadrant "C".
2.4.5 Wear Strips
Removable wear strips will be installed in the through
tube from tho quadrant "C" end of the tube to the approximate
centerline of the core. These strips will insure proper
positioning of the capsule and prevent any displacement of the
capsule while in the through tube. Also these strips will
protect the through tube from damage or wear acsociated with
insertion and removal.
_.5 Sample Handlin_ Description
2.5.1 Hot Cave Preparation
im
Subsequent to irradiation of'a test sample, the "rear"
section" of the capsule will be inserbed into the quadrant
wall tube (shown in Figure l), secured, s_aled, depressurized
and warmed up. Prior to receiving the capsule, the hot cave
(shown in Figur_ I) will have been set up _dth a new sample,
necessary replacement parts and will have been !netted to insure
a substantial helium atmosphere to prevent contamination of the _-
cryogenic system.
13
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2.5.2 Capsmle Sample Replacement
The hot cave remote tool indexing drum will be
_ositioned, and the capsule end electrical Jumpers will
be remcved and secured to a stowage rack within the cave.
The indexing drum _lll be repositioned, and the end plug
will be removed and transferred to its stowsge rack. As
the sample is withdrawn, the sections of the sample pull
rod will be disconnected and transferred to the stowage
rack in the hot cave. The last section with the sample
attached will be withdrawn from the capsule and set into
the water tight sample transfer container with its electrical
and instrumentation leads. The container cover will be
installed, and it will be transferred back into the quadrant
through the adjacent 12'_tube for subsequent transfer to
the PBRF hot cells for examination and testing.
The sample transfer container with a new sample will be
swung into position, and its cover will be removed. The
sample, with new _,lectrical and instrumentation leads attached,
will be withdrawn from the container and inserted into the
capsule. The sample will be pushed into the caps le with
its wires trailing as pull red sections are connected.
Finally, the end plug will be attached to the pull rod; and
the entire unit will be inserted to _ts final position and
the end plug secured.
The electrical and instrumentation lead Jumpers will be
installed.
After electrical and instrumentation lead checkout, pressure
and vacuum testing, the capsule will be withdrawn from the
quadrant wall tabe and cooldown will be started.
2.6 _adrant Wall Tube Sealing System
Two tubes existing in the quadrant "C" wall will be used for
sample removal and transfer. One tube will be used for capsule
insertion to tn_ hot cave. This tube will contain a valve and flange
on the quadrant side and a swing door on the hot cave side. The
second tube will be used for sample transfer from t he hot cave back
to the quadrant water. This tube will contain a similar swing door
on the hot cave side and valve on the quadrant side.
2.6.i Sample Removal Tube
[
a) Flan_e - On the quadrant side a gasketed flange I
will be installed on the existing tube. This
!
J
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flange will be forced against the capsule flang_
upon capsule insertion to the hot e_ve; and during
sample removal, it will be the primary seal between
the quadrant and hot cave.
b) Valv___._ee- ._remotely operated valve will be instal-ed
between the flange and the wall on the tube. This
valve will be closed providing the primary seal
between the hot cave ana quadrant except during periods
of capsule insertion and sample removal.
c) Swin_ Door - A water tight hinged closure will be I
installed on the hot cave side of the tube. This door
will be closed _until the flange co:_ection is made
between the tube flange and capsule flange. The tub_
will then be drained of water, and the donr will be
unlocked and opene d for sample removal. After sample
removal, the procedure _ill be reversed _ud the swing
door locked. This door will now provide a backup
fo_,the valve on the quadrant side. Intorlocks w'll
be installed on the swing door an_ "lange ¢onnecti,;n
to insure a proper seal before opening the door and
to guarantee that quadrant water will no_ be drained
lnt_ the hot cave. =
2.6.2 Specimen Transfer _ube
a) S_ng Door (1) - On the hot cave s_de of the tube, a
water tight hinged closure will be installed sim&lar
to the sample removal tube door. This door wil" be
opened so that the sample transfer container can be
inserted into the tube. The do_r will then be locked
in place.
On the quadrant side of the through tube, s remotely
operated valve will be installed. After the swing door
is secured, this valve will be opened so that the
sample transfer container can be moved into qu_draat "C"
frum the tube. This valve is the primary seal between
the quadrant "C" water and the hot cave. The swing
door on the hot cave side willbe a backup Seal, and
both closures will be designed to r.es_et the quadrant
water pre._sure.
m • m _ m m _ | mN m _ am | _ m w m m "
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2.7 Environmental Control Systems
The two primary variables to be controlled in the loop are
mass flow rate and capsule inlet temperature. The flow paths through
the capsule are shown in Figure 8. (_.ompressorinlet pressure,
secondary flows and expar_der load will be manipulated within design
limits to achieve the desired mass flow rate. Secondary flows and
expander load will be varied to _ontrol capsule inlet temperature.
In addition, it may be convenient to throttle the return leg of
bhe primary coolant in order to r6gulate coolant velocities in the
capsules. It may- also be convenient to throttle a bypass coolant
flow for fine control of the mass flow rate.
The system cooling will be initiated with the capsule
outside the reactor. The oompressor startup bypass will be
opened to minimize st_-a-tingload on the compressor. The"
compressor house layout is shown in Figure i0. During steady-
state operation, the automatic flow control will be from the
regulator valves on the gas storage bnttles and the rellef
v_Ive on the compressor inlet and possibly a bypass throttling
valve. The automatic temperature control at the cspsule inlet
will be accomplished by controlling the load on the expander,
probably by vars,ing the field on a generat__ which is driven
by the expanJer and which dumps energy into a fixed load bank.
2.7.2 Auxiliary Equi"pment
Auxiliary equipment for the loop is of two types:
loop support equipment and capsule handling equipment. Loop
support equipment includes vacuum equipment, liquid nitrogen
equipment, cooling _:a_er equipment, heS_:.umstorage bottles
and the load bank. The capsule handliIAg equipment includes
equipment in the loading cave and underwater handling equip-
ment in the quadrant. The auxiliary equipment is operated
mantk_lly or by remote controls. Indications are sent from the
equipment to the loop control panel or the capsule handling
panel.
The speed of capsule insertion into the reactor is
inherently limited by the insertion motor whJ ch cannot exceed
synchronous speed at power line frequency. The speed of
withdrawal is sLmilarly limited. Insertion and withdrawal can
be controlled locally in the reactor building at the capsule
handling panel; withdrawal can also be initiated vza the loop
control panel.
16
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2.7..3: Ihst manent ation
The inst:rumentat'ionwill' oonsistt of;:"
a) loop temperature, pressure ar_d_flow,ih_Ica%'ur_an4_r_oord@r_,.
b) capsule ten_perature recorders,
c) vacuum Jacket pressure, coolant llow, expander load_
valve position and compressor voltage and current
Indicators,
d) low flow, loss of vacuum, high capsule outlet tempera-
ture, high compressor inlet or outlet pressure, high
filter _P, high _a_,_- ---_P,_............uo _ _ ]p_ weight and -
low liquid nitrogen level alarms.
The controllers are a_ previously described.
2.7.& Exper.iment-Reactor Interlocks _ _j
Alarms will be provided to notify reactor operators
of loop trouble, and preparations will be made for withdrawal _
of the inpile section. Procedural restrictions will prohlb_t
manipulation of the inpile section during planned cha_@_s in
reactor power, but no automatic interlocks are pl-_ied.
/
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$.D Hazards Evaluation
3.1 Philosophy of Operation
It is intended that the design of the capsule insertion and
removal 5y_te_ ._i_,_ ...._ ._ +_*_ _=si_!e e_eriment operator can easily
and rapidly carry, out an _mergenc 7 ,ithdrav_ul of the capsule to protect
the reactor both from day,rage, mud from unnecessary shutdown in situations
where an experi_ent parameter is approaching an excessive value. This t_pe
of removal wouli be carried out op12z-withthe appropriate approval and
assistance of the reactor operating crew.
%'Zqi!e_._i::hoped that the removal capability described above will
_ake it possible to handle ex-p:erimentproblems wfthout requiring a reactor
shutdo_m, _he possibiiiLy al,.;avse_sts _-_,,=_s,nabnormal condition may
develop too rapidly to cope ,^ith in this r,anner. Therefore, certain
experiment conditions should cause an automatic reactor shutdown. A tentative
list of these is given below:
Helium Flow-Low
Helium Temperature-F_igh
He!itu.nPressure-Low
Experiment Power Failure
Through Tube Coolmnt Flow-Low
Secondary Coolmnt Flow-Low
o SDecific Postulased Accident
3 •2.1 Maximum Credible Accident
The investigations of possible accidents so far rerformed
have not re=ulted in determining any situation which is clearly the ma_dmum
credible accident. However, it appears that the maximum effect the e_-#eriment
could have on the reactor is through its influence on reactivity, which is _
discussed below.
Prior to the initiation of any of the NERVA irradiation tests
conducted in HT-1, reactivity worth tests will be run on the actual capsule
(or a mockup of same) in the PBRF critical facility. All pressure, temperature
and flow ranges corresponding to normal operating limits will be used in
conjunction with a representative sample. In addition, a reactivity test
will be accomplished prior to the initiation of any individual run if
calc_u!ations indicate that the specific sample might, have a greater reactivity
£fect than the representative sample.
18
J
1966014551-025
!-e
q
a. Capsule Insertion e_',dWithdrawal Rates
The capsule ",_ill bc ,_Jasertedinto and removsd from HT-I at
the same speed. The speed will be the same for al/ tests indlca_ed
in Section 2 of this report. The insertion speed finally selected
will be based on measured control rod and predicted ca2sztle worthe
with appropriate leeway retained for reasor_bly absorptive samples.
_ However, capsule drive motors may be changed if axperi_ ,nts not
current]_ listed are found to have exceptionally large reactivit_
effects, or if predicted reactivity values are found to be incorrect.
The speed selected is o_.efoot/rain. This is based on; a tobal
inserted reactivdty change of l%Z_k/k; 0.1% _k/inch; and a minimum
controlled_ k reverse rate of 1.2% _ k/rain.
b, Accidental Caps.u..le Ejection
A 1% change in reactivity occurring upon accidental
ejection of the capsule from HT-I can be ccntrolled° The minimum
reactivity insertion time for which control of a 1% _k chan.ge can be
maintained is approximately 0.15 sec.*
The nominal 50 gpm cooling water flow rate _,uHT-1 cettld
sustain a capsule ejection velocity of only 0.283 ft/sec. Hence, in
excess of 7 sec. would be required for the insertion ef 1% _ k/k if
all the flow were effective _ moving the capsule.
An orifice Fiate or tube in the water inlet line and a
check valve in the outlet line will assure that the ma_ flew of
water to HT-I will be limited to a safe value with respect to capsule
 ty.
I_RFFinal Hazards Summary, Part III, Figure I 27, P. l?l
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3.2.2 LclssGf,_eli_m Flo_
A loss of cooling flow to the sample and capsule
internal pressure containing wall (heJlum envelope) will
not result in an unsafe condition for the sample, capsule
or reactor. However, to preserve the integrity of the
pressure containing helium envelope, the r_:acLor _wer
should be reduced upon a less of flow.
An undesired loss of flow could result from a
compressor or expander outage or an inadvertent closing of
eithsr of the capsule isolatici, valves. Reactor power
reduction will be initiated by signals from the following
sensors: compressor powerj expander load, capsule
differential pressure.
As a result of loss of flow but w_th contirLued gamma
heating of the sample, sample shroud, and helium envelope,
all m_al t_,peratures would rise. Some heat would be
transferred to the _.agna_ helium by natural convection,
but heat could not be transferred to the (outer) water-
cooled capsule wall because of the vacuum gap between that
wall and the helium envelope. Heat transferred to the
stagnant helium would raise its temperatu1_ and pressure.
However, the capsule safety valve would protect against
prc_surizing the helium envelope above the 130 psia design
pressure.
Analysis of the incident is based on the foiio_-i._
assumptions: &U heat generated in the helims pressure
containL_ wall goes to increasing the wall temperature;
full power heat generation continues for one full second
after the cessation of flow and therea._er decreases to
2% during 1.16 seconds; initial average wall temperature is
lO0°F. Full power heat generation is assumed to follow a
cosine distribution with a maximum of 12 w/gin at the core
centerline.
Results of the analysis indicate that the maximum wall
temperature reached under th_se conditions will not be
sufficl_ to c-_,_.qefailure of the helium envelope wall due
to Ahe reduced strength at the elevated t_perature.
20
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3.2.3 Exp_r_,_entPower Fai12,_re
This will result in compl_te loss cf coolant
circulation. Even if the outage is a local one affecting
on_v loop circuits, the reactor will be shutdown by a
shutdown signal from the experiment. The situation then
becomes that analyzed under loss of coolant flow. It is
_,_r_e_ +_ _11pp1_kvemergency power to the capsule insertion
_nd withdrawal system, and to certain critical measuring
and control devices.
3.2.4 Loss of Secondary.Coo!ant Flow
This will require a rapid (and p_obab_v automatic)
_hutdown of the helium comp_-essors,which causes the "Loss
of System Coolant Flow" previously discussed.
3.2.5. Handling Accident
The materials and components to be tested in the
initial phase of operation of this experiment (covered by
this document) are unfueled solids and the production ef
radioactive liquids and gases is expected to be negligible.
On this basis a handling accident which could result in
serious injury or damage is not expected.
3•2.6 Instrumenl Failure
As far as possible, all measuring devices will be
"fail safe", so that upon the most probable mode of failure,
the indication will be that which i_ least desirable. In
addition, any measuring device whose output might call for
a reactor shutdown will be provided with a "backup".
21
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3.2.7 Control System Failure
As in the case of measuring devices, all control
elements will be as "fail safe" as possible. Regardless
of this, the worst situation a control system malfunct _on
could produce is considered to be a "Los_ of Helium Flo_'
either by compressor shutdo_m or valve closure.
3.2.8 Chemical Reactions
All Lmterials involved in both the test specimens
and the loop components are inert chemically in the en-
virorsnent to which they will be exposed.
3.2.9 Boiling
Ane po__ o_ _n_1_ng the cooling_ water in HT-1
has been considers4 and is discussed below.
3.2.9.1 Normal Operatin_ Conditions
The outlet temperature of the cooling
water in HT-1 will be suostantially less than the
the saturation temperature at the minimum outlet
pressure. This is because the total amount of heat
generated in the outer capsule wall and the HT-I
wall (taken at a 12 w/gin gamma heating rate throughout)
is considerally less than the heat dump capacity of
the 50 gpm cooling water flow. The surface t_nperature
of the capsule will be somewBat less the_ 2500F.
Consequently, neither saturated nor subcooled boiling
of the cooling water can occur under normal operating
conditions.
3.2.9.2 Loss of HT-I Coolin_ Water Flow
A loss of cooling water flow could conceivabl_
occur as a result of a blockage of the radial gap
between the capsule and through tube walls or an inad-
vertent closing of the valve in the HT-I inlet line.
This would result in a subcooled nucleate boilimg regime.
22
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A reactor power reduction will prevent
boiling under these circumstances. Power reduction
will be initiated by signals from water flow and
£ressu_e sensors. Hence, no unstable reactor
condition due to void formation could result from a
loss of cooling flow.
3.2.9.3 Loss of HT-1 Cooling Water
A loss of coolant from HT-1 or from the
portions of the coolant inlet and outlet lines
between HT-1 and the isolation valves in the lln6s
could occur. Depending on the location of the
rupture, the result would be similar to a loss of
coolant flow, covered above, (inlet llne rupture with
check valve in outlet line preventir_ backflow) or
would constitute a condition of increased flow past
the capsule (outlet line or capsule seal failure).
A decrease in the water pressure, tending to reduce
the time tc ini*iation of boiling, would occur in
either case. However, in the latter case, the
increased flow past th_ capsule and the power reduction
caused by the low flow alarm would preclude the possi-
bility of boiling the coolant (the flow meter i_uitiating
the low flow alarm is located downstream of the check
valve, thus protecting against loss of coolant as w811
as loss of flow incidents).
23
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!_ile the capsule is _,n_he t'_u_h tube., ,c_psu_e
_a_._re ,may occur from either _he e_bernaA _1_ressttre. _
•he ,_sn% water (160 psi)or _he interna! _re_ema_e o_
_e _he_lum system.
_._iO.l External Shell
Failure of the eXter_a_ Shell will .ea_mse
_he inner shell (helium envelope)) _o excessive
external pressure, probably _causlng it %0 collapse
in some unpredictable fashion. _Is m_y a.esult _m
partial or complete blockage o£ ce_lamt flew;, but
this should not cause excessive temperatures to
develop, particularly since a _eactor shutdown wi_l
take place. Improved heat %_amsZ_r conditions
exist due to filling of the capsule with water.
The reactivity effect .o_ _looding the
capsule void must also be °considered. From the
calculatlons of similar fleodlng s_ituations presented
in the PBRF Final Hazards Summary, it is expected
that this effect will be small and controllable;
however, measurements of flooding effect will be made
before experiment operation.
Amother result of this failure would be
the possibility of the passage of radioactive primary
coolant water up the annular vacuum spaces in the
coolant lines, and possibly the coolant passages
themselves. Thi_ could produce excessive rs.diation
levels in occupied areas. However, the dose rates due
to this occurrence should be such that etandard
radiation monitoring; and evacuation procedures will
prevent overexposures.
3.2. i0.2 Inner Shell (Helium F_velope)
Failure of this shell will flood the vacuum
insulating space with low temperature _elium, chilling
the external shell and possibly producing some water
freezing o_ its outside surface. However, any ice
formation should be small and of very short duration,
] 9660 ] 455 ] -Og]
_:_ncet_ _ heat removal capacity of the
system at _ _s approximately 200 KW, whereas
the heat _l&_l@ f_om through tube cooling
water, if OO@_Id _O _2_F, will be approximately
i000 _.
The _I_PO O_ _he helium envelope
should not Jeop_d_|e SJhe 0xt_e_ shell structural
qualities, sines _ho l_s_ i_ designed for (and
subjected to) 160 pD.__@_TMMI pressure and will
withstand the approxi_ato _15 psi internal pressure
of the helium system,
3.2.LI. Reactor Excursion
A reactor excursion of I0 milliseconds as described in
the PBRF Final Hazards Summary is -alculated to produce a maximum
tem_rature increase in the capsule of 26°F. This rise in
temperature should not cause any failures in _e experiment.
%
2_
1966014551-032
26
1966014551-033
FLUID WILI_" ll]__
iiii ii• ........ . .... _ ii •
Utility Use Flow Rate
i,
i .... -,-- i | i
settee Air lost., andeamrol l I0 (f't.-?'/_..)1 .
Tml_
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ELECTRICAL POWER RF__S
Type of Power Use Power (EW)
F
_60 V _ 3,_ l_p Compressor
F-
Emergency Powar In_trumenta_lon and Control 25
_8_V 60_I 4 Devices
120 V 60_i_ Instrumentation and Control 25
Devices
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Fig. No. 1
-_t - Plan Inside Containment
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Fig. No.4
Capsule - SanqpleEnd
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Fig. No. 5
Capsule - Enlarged Section - Sample El_,d
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Fig. No. 6
In Core Section of Copsule
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Fig. No. 7
Capsule- Middle Section
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